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Economic Theory of Human Behaviour
The analysis of political measures influencing all areas of competence 
for political actors is structured and eased by a theoretical conception of 
individual  human  behaviour.  As  a  result  of  the  approach  of  the 
methodological individualism the conception of individual behaviour is 
getting  even more important  because of the  assumption that  a state, a 
company or an organisation can not be understood as an independent actor 
on the political and economic level. The behaviour of these social units 
has to be understood as the sum of decisions taken by the individuals 
understanding themselves  as  being part  of these collectives.  Following 
this approach all activities on the macro-level is determined by actions Revista Economică
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happening  on  the  micro-level  and  so  the  macro-level  can  only  be 
understood with a proper analysis of the micro-level. Starting with the 
concept of the homo economicus we do assume that all individuals try to 
maximise their benefit following an individual cost-benefit-analysis. This 
maximum benefit does not have to go together with the maximum benefit 
of the collective the individual is part of because first of all individuals do 
focus on their egoistic needs and will only be part of a collective if they 
see a possibility to maximise their individual benefit with playing a role in 
a  collective.  The  homo  economicus-concept  assumes  that  all  constant 
individual preferences are maximised regarding the additional condition 
of complete rational decision-making and given restrictions. Restrictions 
for example could exist in restrictions of budget coming from a limited 
earned income or income as a result of individuals owned capital. Further 
on  restrictions  do  appear  as  a  result  of  existing  social  conventions, 
customs, positive law or laws of nature like those of time and space.
1
The  homo  economicus will  use  the  tool  of  complete  rationalism  to 
accrete  his  individual  benefit  while  – following  theory  – he  has  all 
necessary  information  to  make  adequate  decisions  like  a  perfect 
knowledge about the actual and future behaviour of all other actors being 
in interaction with him. He is anticipating all events without having to 
face any time delays or costs and is in the possession of a perfect analysis 
of all options of acting for all other actors influencing his existence. Even 
if the homo economicus-model does not have any pretensions to explain 
the behaviour of individuals existing in real life in total, it is of course a 
very important tool to facilitate the complexity of the human behaviour 
analysis being the most important basis for economic theory in general.
„Economic  theory  does  not  come  up  the  complexity  of  its  object  of 
investigation. But – on one hand – nobody affirms that it does. And on the 
other hand, there is no other theory in the scientific world that does come 
up with the complexity (…) of any object..“
2
If it comes to critical approaches towards the homo economicus-model
the assumption of complete rationalism is challenged as not realistic and 
displaced by a modified model of constrictive rationalism. This analytical 
approach  starts  from  the  assumption  that  unforeseeable  events  stay 
                                                     
1 See Voigt (2002), p. 27
2 Kirsch (2004), p. 2. Translation by the author.Nr. 3(40)/2008
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unforeseeable even for individuals with a complete rationalism. We do 
observe categories like coincidence or destiny and these categories lead to 
an  indefinite  level  of  uncertainty  which  action  alternative  in  a  certain 
situation  is  adequate  to  maximises  individual  benefits.  At  this,  human 
beings are  able to  reduce the  risk of a wrong suboptimal decision via 
experience  or  a  mathematical  calculation of  probability. Despite  of all 
efforts to minimise risk it is in general not possible to reduce that risk 
down to zero which explains why individuals permanently cast doubts on 
each decision they take about their future actions.
1 This uncertainty and 
the generated costs because of that condition of risk can be minimised –
but  not  eliminated  - through  norms  and  conventions  being  a  result  of 
society’s experiences over the long-run.
Transaction Costs
Institutions  created  by  human  beings  do  in  fact  help  to  reduce  the 
complexity of the world the individuals are acting in. They could help to 
minimize  the  probability  of  wrong  decisions  and  reduce  the  costs  of 
decision finding arising from the inevitable fact of partial ignorance of all 
actors.
2 These costs, the so-called transaction costs, consist out of costs for 
search and information, bargaining or policing and enforcement and do 
occur with every action done on the market of each actor.
3 Transaction 
cost do accrue first of all for the individual if it finds itself in the situation 
to choose between two different alternatives of action. The individual has 
to inform itself about the nature of the different alternatives to choose 
from.  The  individual  has  to  calculate  which  alternative  might  be  the 
adequate  one  to  maximise  its  benefits.  Internal  institutions  like 
conventions,  experiences,  habits  or  customs  might  augment  the 
transaction costs if the adequate alternative runs into a conflict with them. 
These transaction costs will manifest themselves in the form of self-doubt 
or  a  guilty  conscience.  On  the  other  hand,  transaction  costs  will  be 
reduced by the fact that an adequate alternative is conform to the internal 
institutions.  Through  interaction  on  the  market,  additional  transaction 
                                                     
1 See Knight (1922)
2 The term of (new) complexity (neue Unübersichtlichkeit) is affected by 
Habermas as a description of a growing intricacy and uncontrollable nature of the 
system of public action. His description could be easily adopted to the sphere of 
individual acting. See. Habermas (1985), p. 141ff
3 See Dahlmann (1979), p. 141ffRevista Economică
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costs might occur because of the costs of market-use.
1 If markets would 
work perfectly, all transactions on markets would be efficient and free of 
costs. If this would be the case, there would hardly be an explanation for 
the  existence  of  organisations  to  ease  transactions  on  the  market  (for 
example companies). On a perfect market each individual would be able 
to realise its optimal transaction plan permanently without having to face 
any costs. The existence of companies but as well the existence of laws 
regulating markets and the state being the institution to enforce that laws 
are accepted and implemented leads us to the fact that transaction costs do 
exist.  And  if  this is  the  case,  external and internal institutions and  all 
forms  of  organisations  could  be  understood  as  units  to  minimize 
transaction  costs  for  individuals.  The  aim  of  external  institutions  for 
example is to increase transaction costs for a behaviour being not conform 
to  the  general  rules  to  an  amount  high  enough  to  minimize  an  actors 
appeal to realise it.
2 Transaction costs will increase on one hand with the 
number of individuals acting on the market and on the other hand with the 
number  of  transactions  being  realised  on  the  market.
3 An  increasing 
number of collective’s individuals will implement an increasing number 
of internal and external institutions while the demand for public goods 




One condition for the possibility of the implementation of markets is 
the development of property rights traded on markets to allow an efficient 
allocation  of  resources.
5 Within  large  collectives  besides  a  market  for 
goods the members of the group do create a political market to produce 
                                                     
1 See Coase (1937), p. 386ff
2 For a detailed desription of internal and external institutions see Voigt (2002), p. 
32ff
3 Following an estimation of Wallis and North the ratio of the transaction cost 
sector as part of the American GDP for 1970 was 54.7%, while it was only 26% 
in 1870. See North/Wallis (1986), p. 95ff
4 An evident example for the transformation of a collective situation without any 
institutions and high transaction costs into a society with efficient institutions is 
given in the description of the state of nature realising a war all against all and its 
change-over to a society with a social contract by Thomas Hobbes. See Hobbes 
(1986)
5 See Klump (1989), p. 123ffNr. 3(40)/2008
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decisions about the creation of public goods.
1 These public goods have to 
correspond in their consistence with the demand existing in the collective. 
The bigger a collective becomes, the more difficult it will get to produce a 
proper  decision about  which  alternative  might  be  the  best  one  for  the 
collective  because  preferences  will  be  more  and  more  diversified. 
Especially public goods consisting only out of internal institutions will 
hardly be implemented in big collectives. In small collectives one could 
argue that internal Institutions are produced through negotiations between 
the members of the group while facing low transaction costs. As long as 
all members of the group agree to these institutions the collective only has 
to  face  the  costs  for  the  control  of  adherence  by  the  members  of  the 
group.
2 With growing collectives the social ties being responsible for the
fact that all members of the collective have an interest in respecting the 
common institutions are getting loose and will disappear at a certain point. 
With these disappearing social ties the effect of social control and the 
adherence of the internal institutions will disappear as well. To face this 
problem, big collectives tend to produce external institutions like positive 
laws to reduce transaction costs and organisations to make sure that these 
institutions are respected by all members of the group. Compared to a 
situation  of  a  big  collective  without  any  external  institutions  the 
implementation of for example a police or a court is able to reduce on 
one-hand transaction costs of the citizens and might reduce as well the 
strategic incertitude of the citizens. On the other hand a system of external 
institutions is able to produce solutions for problems of allocation and 
distribution  that  might  appear.
3 As  a  result  out  of  the  historical 
development of different collectives, all of them have to face a certain 
path dependence of all different institutions and organisations developed 
by the collective. They have to reflect on one side the actual needs of 
society, on the  other hand each  collective is  transporting through time 
historically grown individuality. The transformation of political markets 
through the last thousand years show that there are diversified forms of 
regulation existing parallel and staying in a competition which each other 
as a necessity. The democratic forms of regulation this article refers to 
                                                     
1 The terms of public good and collective good will be used in a similar meaning 
in this article. They need to have the attribute of a non-rival consumption and 
non-excludable consumers.
2 See Kirsch (2004), p. 88
3 See Voigt (2002), p. 38fRevista Economică
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have  developed  as  well  different forms  through  time  and  for  example 
show  different  reactions  to  the  adoption  of  equal  instruments  of 
economical politics. That is the reason why one collective could not easily 
copy the experiences made with an instrument by an other collective. 
„An  economy is  the  result  of  development  processes that  could  not  be 
easily  reversed.  This  development  not  only  determines  if  citizens  are 
satisfied  but  as  well  the  reasons  for  their  satisfaction.(…)  These 
developments always exhibit a momentum and a country gets on a certain 
path. That does mean as well that all countries could only become happy 
by following their individual path. Their economic past is necessarily part 
of their economic future. “
1
Even if these democratic collectives are very different from each other, 
the  development  of  a  certain  mode  of  decision-making  is  common  to 
mostly all of these collectives. This mode of decision-making consists out 
of the political actor and the voters coming together in a barter deal. As 
part of this analysis, the political actor is seen as an individual that tries to 
maximize  its  needs  in  form  of  power  being  transferred  to  him  by  his 
voters.
2 To ensure or even increase his power the politician has to adopt a 
political program corresponding to the demand of a maximum number of 
voters. This is reachable in a two party system by orienting the political 
program  towards  the  needs  of  the  individual  being  the  median  in  the 
spectrum of voters.
3 In exchange to votes the political actor is promising 
that he will (at least partly) implement the program he offered during his 
election campaign to maximize the benefits of the collectives majority. 
The transaction costs resulting out of the barter deal are high because is 
very difficult for voters to get certain information and to control if the 
promised program really is implemented in detail.
4 Transaction costs will 
be minimized through recurring elections. Now it is in the interest of the 
                                                     
1 Heuser (2008), p. 100f. Translation by the author.
2 The Schumpeterian models of the democratic mode or the competitive 
democracy have to be understood as basic models for the economic analysis of all 
democratic systems. See Schumpeter (1993), p. 427ff
3 This is only the case for a two-party-model. If it comes to a multiple-party –
model of if preferences of voters are multi-dimensional the whole system is 
reaching easily an exorbitant complexity with political actors having problems to 
identify their optimal platform for their political offer.
4 See North (1990) und North (1993)Nr. 3(40)/2008
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political  actor  to  implement  at  least  important  parts  of  his  election 
program to avoid a reduction in the number of votes and in individual 
power as a result of the coming elections.
1 He has an interest in producing 
collective goods that do correspond with the needs of the collective as 
long as he is interested to stay into power and as long as he understands 
the maximisation of his benefit as the maximisation of his power. If the 
produced  collective  goods  do  not  harmonize  with  the  needs  of  the 
collective the political actor has to face the problem that opportunity costs 
for the voters towards the acceptance of the present government decline 
and a growing percentage of members prefer to react with voice- or exit-
actions.
2 It is assumed in the model that political actors neither do not 
have any interest in a high percentage of population campaigning actively 
against the government nor do have an interest in a growing number of 
citizens leaving the country.
External Effects
Models  of  collective  decision-making  do  fulfil  the  task  of  a 
minimization  of  transaction  costs  and  the  strategic  uncertainty  for  all 
members of a collective. In addition they have the function to avoid or to 
internalize externalities that occur out of the process of allocation.
3 The 
appearance of external effects can necessarily not be avoided in complex 
social interactions. But external effects could lead to suboptimal decisions 
regarding the allocation of resources and might have undesirable effects 
towards the distribution of resources. As in general external effects are not 
integrated in the cost-benefit-calculus of an individual, its decisions might 
lead for example to a suboptimal production plan and to a waste of short 
resources. As an individual is not fully responsible for all effects resulting 
out  of  its  actions  but  only  responsible  for  the  outcome  of  its  own 
activities, costs and benefits of the individual could be externalised. As an 
effect of this externalization, an innocent bystander might have to face 
these costs or benefits and might have to realize constrictions in his or her 
personal  welfare.  These  constrictions  might  stay  in  contrast  to  the 
                                                     
1 See Kirsch (2004), p. 256ff
2 See Hirschman (1988)
3 The terms externality and external effect are used here in a similar way and 
identify „(…) Consequences of decisions that have to be faced in a positive or 
negative way by somebody who did not take the decision or was not related to the 
process of decision-making.“ Kirsch (2004), p. 29Revista Economică
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normative  distributive  order  of  costs  and  benefits  regarding  the 
collective’s accord, a situation that is more likely to result out of external 
costs than out of external benefits.
1 As a solution for conflicts that might 
appear out of the existence of externalities, Arthur Cecil Pigou suggested 
to  implement  a  compensation  between  the  producer  and  the  person 
concerned of externalities, the so-called Pigou tax.
2 A task for the political 
actor would be to identify the amount of compensation that has to be paid 
to avoid misallocations and to assure an adequate charge and distribution 
of  the  compensations.  But  even  with  having  developed  such  a 
compensation  society  will  realise  a  deadweight  loss  because  a 
compensation could only be implemented with an investment in high costs 
for information and enforcement. 
Figure 1: Compensational equilibrium following the Coase theorem
3
According to the assumption of a not-existence of transaction costs or 
very low transaction costs and the implementation of tradeable property 
rights,  the  Coase theorem is  providing a  different approach  towards  a 
solution for that problem. Following this solution an efficient allocation of 
                                                     
1 See Kirsch (2004), p. 30
2 See Pigou (1920)
3 See Fritsch/Wein/Ewers (1996), p. 135Nr. 3(40)/2008
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goods could be realized even without an intervening and compensating 
state. This will be reachable if there is a possibility to find a solution to the 
distributive  problems  through  negotiations  between  the  producers  of 
externalities and the concerned individuals.
1 The producer of externalities 
could compensate the concerned individuals for the damage as long as the 
marginal costs of damage for the concerned individuals is identical to the 
marginal  costs  of  damage  avoidance  for  the  producer.  Following  the 
assumption of marginal costs of damage limitation a realised equilibrium 
situation is shown in Figure 1. 
In a starting position in advance to all negotiations, the production of 
an external effect has an amount of damage correlating to A0 as the result 
for the concerned person. If both parties would agree through negotiations 
to reduce the amount of externalities by AN, the benefit out of the damage 
limitation  (ABQN)  would  outbalance  the  costs  for  this  limitation  of 
damage (ANP). Assuming that it will be as well part of the negotiated 
agreement  that  the  concerned  person  is  paying  a  compensation  of  the 
amount  of  ANP to  the  producer  of  externalities,  both  parties  would 
optimize  their  pareto-position in  relation  to  the  starting  situation. The 
limitation  of  damage  would  be  broadened  until  the  marginal  costs  of 
damage limitation are equal to the marginal benefit of the limitation of 
damage. This situation is realized in point C. If both parties would agree 
that the concerned individual is paying a compensation of the amount of 
CE for  each  not  produced  unit  of  externality  to  the  producer  of 
externalities, both parties would realize a pareto-optimal situation in point 
C. Related to the starting situation the producer of externalities would be 
able to increase its benefit by ACF, while the concerned individual would 
be able to increase its individual benefit related to the starting position by 
BCF.
This process according to the Coase theorem might lead to a pareto-
optimal distribution  of  costs  and  benefits  between  two  partners  of 
negotiation as long as transaction costs are absent. Its implementation in 
reality however is strongly related to the existence of transaction costs and 
the amount of transaction costs that might appear. Already in a situation 
with  two  negotiating  partners  both  will  have  to  face  high  costs  for 
information and enforcement. These costs will be increased intentionally 
by the opponents to improve their individual position of bargaining. If 
                                                     
1 See Coase (1960)Revista Economică
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agreements  have to  be  produced  in  collectives  with  a  high  amount  of 
diversified members, these transaction costs will easily reach prohibitive 
dimensions.  As  a  result  of  a  competitive  democracy  collectives  could 
reduce  transaction  costs  by  producing  public  goods.  These  institutions 
could assure the implementation of a balance between costs and benefits 
of externalities according to the normative preferences of the collectives’ 
majority.  Further  on  the  Coase  theorem could  be  transferred  from the 
level  of  solution  producing  between  individual  actors  to  the  level  of 
solution producing between collective actors. 
1 If individuals with equal or 
similar  preferences ally in lobbies the  whole collective could  realise a 
sharp  reduction  of  occurring  transaction  costs  and  come  to  similar 
solutions of negotiations as shown in the example above. In a first step the 
collective  actors  preferences  are  identified  by  a  survey  of  individual 
preferences united in the collective actor, a certain lobby. The decision 
about  the  collective actor’s  preferences will  be  drawn in  general  by a 
majority vote. But as well the minority in the group has a very strong 
position because the majority has to avoid that the minority is using its 
exit- or voice-options. The  majority has a  high  interest in  keeping the 
minority inside the collective actor because it is comprehensible that the 
more  individuals  supporting  a  collective  actor  the  more  promising  its 
strategic position will be in negotiations. In a second step, the collective 
actors are coming together in negotiations to find solutions of problems 
corresponding to the two parties’ negotiations of the Coase theorem. Here 
the collective actors might have to face the danger that the negotiators do 
produce solutions which do not reflect the preference of those individuals 
not being organized as collective actors. So negotiations might have an 
outcome that external benefits are internalized and the external costs of 
externalities are externalized as far as opportunity costs for the individual 
actors to organize themselves in collective actors are still too high. If it 
comes  to  a  realization  of  solutions  produced  through  negotiations  of 
collective actors not being efficient any more a need for the production of 
public goods will rise. This public good will be a system of a principle of 
order realised by laws and enforced under constraint by the state. The 
principle  of order that  will finally be  realized is  the  one  that  gets the 
highest number of votes in elections if the political process is following 
the model of the competitive democracy. A Coase solution might not be 
realistic if transaction costs are avoiding the production of solutions out of 
                                                     
1 See Kirsch (2004), p. 72ffNr. 3(40)/2008
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negotiations. Public goods are needed as well if negotiating parties do not 
come  to  an  agreement  about  the  distribution  of  costs  and  benefits 
supported by all parties negotiating. Finally the Coase solution will not 
work if an important group of members of the collective is excluded from 
the negotiations.
1
A Public Choice Analysis of the European Unions Institutions
Coases way of producing solutions through a process of negotiations 
is  easily  transferable  to  the  international  level  if  it  comes  to  conflicts 
between the preferences of different countries. In the construction of the 
European Union several elements could be understood as outcomes of the 
Coase  theorem  and  as  answers  to  the  limitation  of  that  concept.  The 
distribution of costs and benefits of externalities appearing through the 
interaction of states can be regulated by contracts between the concerned 
states. Political institutions on governmental level are created if political 
actors calculate that a likely positive cost-benefit-relation as an outcome 
of the institution can be realized.
2 Political institutions on an international 
level are established following exactly the same calculation. Supranational 
institutions for example might be able to provide an architectural frame 
for  bilateral  or  multilateral  agreements  to  avoid  or  regulate  the  cross 
bordering of externalities.
3 On the intranational level, there might be an 
additional  motivation for  political  actors  to  minimize  transaction  costs 
related to actions on several political areas. Here the aim of creating new 
intranational institutions will have to respect the existence of certain path 
dependencies influencing the  implementation.  These path  dependencies 
are derived by experiences a countries made by acting on the level of 
international cooperation in the past. And of course transaction costs will 
be  calculated  by  the  governments  related  to  these  experiences.  If  two 
partner states are able to look back to an old and positive cooperation with 
a trustful partnership they will easily tend to intensify their cooperation 
further on as long as both sides have a benefit out of the cooperation. 
Those countries not having made good experiences with an intranational 
cooperation in the past will need higher incentives to do a step towards a 
closer cooperation in the future. For these countries the occurring costs for 
                                                     
1 See Buchanan (1986)
2 See Demsetz (1967)
3 Examples for this kind of supranational organisations might be seen in the 
United Nations (UN) or the World Trade Organization (WTO). Revista Economică
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information, enforcement and negotiations will be a lot higher than the 
costs for those countries having a strong tradition of cooperating. Those 
countries  having  a  tradition  in  cooperation  might  for  example  use  an 
already existing infrastructure of cooperation in the form of intranational 
institutions.  Transaction  costs  could  be  minimized  if  those  already 
existing institutions are to be integrated into new fields of policy. Existing 
structures of information searching or decision-making could be adapted 
to new areas of acting without the implementation of new institutions. For 
collectives  of  a  higher  number  of  states  the  implementation  of  a 
supranational institution might be effective to carry over political tasks 
from the national level in an effective way. The European Union is one 
example for such a supranational institution. It is a result of the fact that 
the member states preferred decline the negotiating model of the Coase 
theorem because of its high transaction costs in favour of an supranational 
institution being accessible for each member state every time. Besides all 
other good (and bad) arguments being in favour of a stronger cooperation 
of the European states, one big incentive to create the European Union 
was  that  a  deeper  integration  is  leading  to  efficiency  gains  and  a 
minimization of transaction costs for all member states being an active 
part of the integration. But it has to be pointed out that the governmental 
aim to  tend  to  a  minimization  of  costs for  administration, information 
searching and coordination does not have to leave necessarily to a general 
centralisation of all fields of policies. According to the neoclassical theory 
of  fiscal  federalism  a  complete  harmonization  and  integration  of  the 
European  community  is  not  desirable  at  all.
1 The  theory  of  fiscal 
federalism  analyses  the  costs  and  benefits  of  the  delegation  of  public 
duties and responsibilities on different levels of a multi-level governance 
system regarding the principles of welfare maximization.
2 The delegation 
of public duties and responsibilities to different political levels do feature 
different costs and benefits because of different designs of the levels. A 
delegation of a public responsibility to a centralized institution might have 
the result of very high costs for motivation and control that decisions are 
made properly and adequate. These costs could reach a level that optimal 
decisions  are  blocked.  Further  on,  the  bigger  an  area  influenced  by 
decisions is, the higher the costs are because of regional inhomogeneity in 
                                                     
1 See Oates (1999), p. 1120ff
2 For an illustration of the interactive political levels of the European Union see 
Scharpf (2002), p. 65ffNr. 3(40)/2008
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preferences of individuals as long as we assume that there is a correlation 
between  the  size  of  a  collective  and  the  divergence  between  the 
preferential orders of individuals being part of the collective. As decisions 
taken by the central institutions, have to correspond with the prohibition 
of  discrimination  and  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity,  harmonized 
decisions by a central institution will get in conflict with heterogeneous 
preferences of the individuals and produce inefficiencies.
1 This could only 
be avoided if the principle of unanimity is implemented in all areas of 
decision  making  by  the  central  institution.  The  disadvantage  of  this 
implementation would be that such a construction would have to face very 
high costs for decision-making. It also leads to the danger that a status quo 
that  is  criticised  as  inefficient  by  a  majority  is  preserved  because  a 
minority  of  members  deserve  it.
2 The  appearance  of  externalities  and 
market failure shows that as well the alternative at the other extreme, a 
complete  decentralization  of  decision-making,  is  leading  to  suboptimal 
decisions. As a result of all that if it comes to the analysis of the European 
Union and its responsibilities it seems to be the central question of the 
adequate  political  level  decision-making  of  different  areas  should  be 
settled down. An answer to that question could only be differentiated and 
always depends on the area of political acting the decision is referring to. 
This aim of differentiation is reflected in the principle of subsidiary being 
implemented  by  the  European  Union through  the  agreement  about  the 
European Community, Article 5:
„Article 5
The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it 
by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein.
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community 
shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if 
and  in  so  far  as  the  objectives  of  the  proposed  action  cannot  be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of 
the  scale  or  effects  of  the  proposed  action,  be  better  achieved  by  the 
Community.
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to 
achieve the objectives of this Treaty.”
3
                                                     
1 See Wagener/Eger/Fritz (2006), p. 147f
2 See Baldwin/Wyplosz (2006),p. 85ff
3 European Community (2002)Revista Economică
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Following the treaty public goods should be produced on a political 
level that is influencing the area being concerned by the political aims. 
Secondly the level of decision-making should be able to internalize all 
costs and benefits resulting out of the production of these public goods. If 
a cross border of effects could be observed, decisions should be settled on 
a higher level coming next to the actual level.
1 Public goods that could be 
effectively  produced  by  the  central  level  are  characterized  through 
economies of scale in production and consumption, taxes affecting the 
distribution of the allocation of resources in the whole political area and 
services  to  the  public  with  spill  over  effects.
2 Further  on,  of  course 
defence is one of the classical fields that should be decided on the central 
level  as  an  elemental  duty.  One  explanation  why  the  countries  of  the 
European Union did not decide until today to centralize their units for 
defence might come out of the fact that this would generate high costs for 
enforcement and validation of decisions. A second important explanation 
is  to  be  found  for  sure  in  the  fact  that  the  level  of  trust  between  the 
members  and  towards  the  institutions  of  the  European  Union  is  not 
elevated enough to go that far. But besides aspects of political economy 
the fact that the integration of defence in the European Union only exists 
in  a  military  cooperation  between  France,  Great  Britain,  Spain,  the 
Netherlands  and  Germany,  could  be  explained  through  normative 
decisions  of  the  member  states.  The  delegation  of  defence  from  the 
member  states  towards  a  central  supranational  institution  would  be 
understood  as  a  turning  away  from  a  confederation  of  states  as  the 
European Union is characterized today by many analysts towards a federal 
state.
3
One useful dimension to decide about proper delegation of decision-
making correlation with the maximization of welfare is given by models 
of competitive order and the preservation of competition. If actors, the 
voter and the politician, producing decisions influencing areas of politics 
are not in the possession of complete information, mistakes in decision-
                                                     
1 See Wagener/Eger/Fritz (2006), p. 149
2 See Inman/Rubinfeld (1998), p. 547
3 That an army matters could be shown by German history. The foundation of the 
second German Reich 1871 by Bismarck out of a confederation of German states 
correlated to the foundation of a unified German army that consisted out of the 
former armies of the states of the German confederation.Nr. 3(40)/2008
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making will occur. The best way to avoid these mistakes or to learn out of 
the mistakes made is a very intensive political competition between the 
low levels of policy-making. In this case competition does function as a 
process  of  exploration.
1 In  this  process,  equilibrium  situations  could 
always be replaced by other equilibrium situations that seem to be more 
efficient and more stable.
2 But this competition of exploratory processes
could only be implemented in a useful way if member states have the 
possibility to  find  individual solutions for their individual problems in 
their individual situation. Each member state needs to have the possibility 
to use experimental ways to find solutions, to choose in an eclectic way 
out of the solutions other member states are offering and to adapt best-
practice-solutions that  seem  to  work.  This  does  reflect  as  well  that 
political approaches being successful in one member state do not have to 
be necessarily successful in the other member states. Each member has to 
respect its individual path dependence and the preferences of its citizens. 
A competition as described above could of course only be possible in a 
political area with decentralized structures. Decentralization is as well a 
crucial point if it comes to the influence of lobbies in the political system. 
Lobbies  want  to  influence  the  process  of  decision making  of  political 
actors  by appealing to  the individual  benefits of the  politician,  not  by 
appealing  to  the  maximization  of  welfare  for  the  whole  citizenship. 
Lobbies try to maximize their rent 
3 by through political decisions without 
any regard towards the question if these decisions are compatible to the 
societies aim to maximize welfare.
4 The more differentiated competences 
in decision-making are the more expensive it is for lobbies to influence 
the whole political system in their intended way because here for they 
need  to  influence  a  high  number  of  actors.  In  addition  to  that,  the 
competition  of  exploratory  processes  leads  to  the  implementation  of  a 
controlling structure  of  checks  and  balances that  has  to  be  taken  into 
account by the politician. As a result of what was said, the decision about 
the delegation of decision-making towards a certain political level of the 
European Union, may it be the municipal level, the provincial level, the 
                                                     
1 See Hayek (1969)
2 The analysis of political action does follow the scientific model of falsification 
introduced by Popper, See Popper (2002)
3 An introduction to different ways and strategies of rent-seeking is given by 
Grüner (2008), p. 97ff
4 See Buchanan/Tollison/Tullock (1980)Revista Economică
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national level or the supranational level should always be a result of a 
calculus of costs and benefits. Delegations of responsibilities towards the 
central level are only efficient if preferences of the European citizens are 
not too heterogeneous regarding the related field of politics. Further on 
only those decision-making elements should be transferred to the central 
level that really affects the whole area of the European Union. This is the 
case if a decentralization of decision-making competencies is related to 
high  costs.  As  a  third  point  the  delegation  of  decision-making 
competencies  towards  the  central  level  makes  sense  if  it  comes  to 
decisions about the production of public goods related with economies of 
scale  in  consumption  and  production.  As  a  last  point  decision-making 
competencies should only be transferred to the European Unions level if 
the central level is in the possession of the necessary information to draw 
an adequate decision and has, connected to that, the political incentive to 
draw  a  decision  according  to  the  preferences  of  the  majority  of  the 
European  citizens.  This  could  be  assured  through  an  intensified 
democratic  control  of  the  actors  on  the  European  level.  A  job,  which 
might  be  done  by  the  European  Parliament  being  legitimated  through 
democratic elections and provided with the necessary instruments to fulfil 
this role as the democratic regulative.
1 A part of this might be as well that 
the Commission, persons and political contents, should be depending to 
the majority voting in parliament and not to the preferences of the member 
states  governments  using  the  Commission  often  for  its  own  national 
interests. The role of the European parliament  seems to  be the  crucial 
point  in  the  future  debate  because  it  is  this  lack  of  democracy  of  the 
European  Union  that  brings  the  citizens  of  the  union  in  opposition  to 
supranational  institutions  through  not  being  observed  as  being  very 
transparent. To improve democratic structures might increase as well the 
incentives  to  trust  these  institutions  and  to  delegate  useful  areas  of 
political decision-making to the European level while taking the profit out 
of this minimization of transaction costs.
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